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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SMITH & EDWARDS COMPANY,
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,
Defendants/Appellants,

:
t
:

v.

i

Case N o . 880114-CA

DOUGLAS YOUNGFIELD, and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTA
Category N o . 6
Respondents.

:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an order of *he Industrial
Commission of Utah awarding workers' compensation r

app 1 i can 1:, Do 1 1 g ] a s i oung f i e ] d t f oi: i i i j u:i : i e s i: e c e i v ed d 1 ir I ng the '
course of his employment i n accordance with Utah Code Ann, % 1S1 4 5 (1988).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utdh rndo Ann

V, l'i I HI. (1MHH

Iij-'lhh lh (Supp. 1987)

and 78-2a-3(a) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission properly found

Mr, >'" oungf i t\l ci' t injury to 1>Q the result of an accident.
2

Whether the Industrial Commission properly found a

legal causal connection between Mi

Younql i old s m i n i s UTKI Ins

employment.
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1

3.

Whether not referring the issue of medical

causation to a medical panel can represent an abuse of discretion
where the ALJ followed the Industrial Commission's rules and
regulations.
4.

Whether evidence of medical causation is

sufficiently established in the record.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1988).

3.

Utah Admin. Code R490-2-18 (1987).

(The above provisions are reproduced verbatim in the
addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 5, 1987f applicant, Douglas Youngfield was
injured in an industrial accident while employed by the Smith &
Edwards Company (R. 3, 14). Applicant filed for a hearing before
the Industrial Commission of Utah because his employer's
insurance carrier refused to accept his claim (R. 3, 51).
i

On July 21, 1987 a hearing before Administrative Law

Judge, Gilbert A. Martinez was conducted.

During the course of

the hearing, Mr. Youngfield testified and exhibits were entered
into the record on his behalf.

Defendants called no witnesses,

offered no exhibits and did not attempt to produce any evidence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, a motion was granted allowing
defendants to supplement the record based on subsequent
investigations (R. 49). The case was diaried for 30 days (R.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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54).

On August 5, 1987 defendants supplemented the record with

i) the dates of Mr. Youngfield's employment and his earnings and
ii) an affidavit concerning the weight of the box which Mr.
Youngfield had lifted causing his injury.
On October 26, 1987 interim findings of fact,
conclusions of law and an order were issued; Mr. Youngfield was
awarded temporary total disability compensation, medical costs
and attorney fees (R. 137-138).

Claims for potential permanent

partial disability were reserved until Mr. Youngfield had been
rated by a qualified physician or orthopedic surgeon (R. 138).
On November 12, 1987, the defendants moved for a review
of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order previously
issued or alternatively for an additional hearing to present
further evidence with respect to the issue of legal causation (R.
140-141).

The motion was referred to the entire Industrial

Commission (R. 142). The Industrial Commission denied the motion
for review and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's Interim
Order (R. 143-144).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Douglas Youngfield was born on December 17, 1954 and is
33 years old (R. 36). On the date of the industrial accident Mr.
Youngfield was employed by the Smith and Edwards Company and was
earning a wage of $ 219.48 per week (R. 14, 27, 128). Although
not married at the time, Mr. Youngfield had one dependant child
under the age of eighteen (R. 13-14).
On February 5, 1987, applicant, Mr. Youngfield, during
Digitized
by theemployment,
Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark his
Law School,
BYU.
the course of
his
performing
regular
duties as a
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r
stock clerk, was lifting cases of shotgun shells from a cart and
loading them on a pallet (R. 14, 27). Mr. Youngfield testified
as he lifted one of the boxes of shotgun shells, he turned to his
left to put the box on the pallet and felt a sharp pain shoot
from the center of his back down his right leg (R. 15). He
dropped the box of shells and fell to the floor (R. 15). Mr.
Youngfield estimated the weight of the individual boxes to be "in
the neighborhood of 75 to a hundred pounds."

(R. 33). The

actual weight, after an exact weighing, was found to be 47*5
pounds (R. 126, 132).
Mr. Youngfield approached his supervisor telling him he
was unsure whether he would be able to work the rest of the day
and sought lighter work (R. 15). Although told he could "go
ahead and go home," Mr. Youngfield finished his shift though
still experiencing pain (R. 15-16).
That night Mr. Youngfield had difficulty sleeping due
to sharp pains in his back, right buttocks and down his right leg
(R. 16). The pain continued the next day when he returned to
work.

Mr. Youngfield testified, "It was painful for [him] to

eyen stand."

(R. 16).

Following the accident, sometime between February 7-12,
1987, Mr. Youngfield sought chiropractic care from Dr. Richard
Barton (See, R. 17, 62). Mr. Youngfield continued seeing Dr.
Barton into May, approximately 15 visits (R. 17, 48).
On February 16, Mr. Youngfield visited Craig Julien,
M.D.. After observing Mr. Youngfield's condition for two weeks,
Dr. Julien recommended a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) test
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R. 17-19, 65). The MRI test revealed a herniated disk and Dr.
Julien referred Mr. Youngfield to a orthopedic surgeon (R. 31,
65).
Mr. Youngfield then had a one time visit Dr. Allison,
an orthopedic physician and surgeon, who advised Mr. Youngfield
on surgical possibilities (R. 23, 48). Dr. Allison diagnosed Mr.
Youngfield as having a low grade S-l radiculopathy on the right,
and recommended conservative treatment, but stated that, should
Mr. Youngfield develop intolerable back and leg pain, he could be
a candidate for myelography and possible surgical intervention
(R. 31, 73).
Mr. Youngfield has a history of related and unrelated
medical conditions.
In July of 1985, Mr. Youngfield was involved in an
automobile accident in which he was rear ended (R. 37). After
the accident Mr. Youngfield complained of mid-back and neck pain
and received chiropractic treatments from Dr. Margolies for three
to four months (R. 37, 42, 44).
In April of 1983, while serving in the Military at Fort
Carson, Mr. Youngfield was diagnosed as having a potentially
fatal skin disease known as scleroderma morphea (R. 20, 22). The
Veterans Administration pays Mr. Youngfield $ 69.00 per month
based on a 10% disability rating (R. 12).
In November of 1983, Youngfield received 10 to 12
chiropractic treatments from Dr. Rick Weum in Colorado Springs
(R. 45). Dr. Weum's report listed the treatments in response to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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chronic low back pain and upper back pain radiating into the neck
and shoulders (R. 46, 64).
And in March of 1977, Mr. Youngfield was X-rayed at St.
Benedicts' Hospital for a strained lower back (R. 36, 40-41, 8690).
On February 11, 1987 Mr. Youngfield's employment was
terminated due to a reduction in force (R. 5, 47# 127). Mr.
Youngfield returned to work for a different employer, The Gift
House, on May 5, 1987 although still suffering some back pain (R.
32).

His new duties were that of a salesman and pawn loan clerk

(R. 33).
To date, Mr. Youngfield has not been paid any
compensation or received any medical benefits (R. 24, 26).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986),
the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45
(1988), the statute which creates a right to workers'
compensation for persons suffering industrial accidents.

In

Allen, the court stated that the statute creates two
prerequisites to finding a compensable injury; i) that the injury
occurred by accident and ii) that a causal connection between the
injury and worker's duties exist.

The second requirement, a

causal connection, includes both legal and medical causation.
In the present case, a review of the record and
relevant case law establish that the ALJ made a proper finding of
an accident as defined by Allen, in that the accident was "an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause
or the result of an injury."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 22.

The ALJ also properly found that a legal causal
connection existed. Applying an objective standard, the ALJ
properly determined that Mr. Youngfield's employment duties,
which included lifting boxes which weighed 47*5 lbs., required an
exertion which was greater that of nonemployment life.
The record contains sufficient evidence from which to
conclude that medical causation exits.

Because Mr. Youngfield

was the only party to offer evidence at the hearing, the evidence
is unrebutted that a connection between Mr. Youngfield's exertion
in lifting the box of shotgun shells and his injury exits.
Furthermore, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in not
referring the issue of medical causation to a medical panel.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1988) establishes that referrals to
medical panels to determine medical causation is permissive and
not required in every case.

In the present case there can not be

an abuse of discretion where i) none of the circumstances
described in Utah Admin. Code R490-2-18 (1987),

Guidelines for

Utilization of Medical Panel, were present and ii) there was no
-uncertain or highly technical" evidence respecting he issue of
medical causation. /
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND MR.
YOUNGFIELD'S INJURY TO BE THE RESULT OF AN
ACCIDENT.
The Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45

Digitized"Every
by the Howardemployee
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
BYU.
(1988) states,
. .
. who
isSchool,
injured
. . . by
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

accident arising out of or in the course of his employment . . .
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury . . . .M

In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah

1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted § 35-1-45 as creating
two prerequisites to finding a compensable injury.

First the

claimant must prove the injury occurred "by accident."

An

accident, as defined in Allen is "an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an
injury."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 22 (emphasis in original).
In the present case, defendants contend that the

Industrial Commission confused the first prerequisite, a
necessary finding of an "accident," with the second prerequisite,
a causal connection between the injury and the employment (Br.
App. 12). See, Allen, 729 P.2d at 18.

Defendants argue:

Given the respondent's preexisting condition
and the fact that his chiropractor had warned
in 1984 that "bending" and "lifting heavy
objects" . . . would lead to the result
which occurred on February 5, 1987, it is
arguable whether the first prerequisite,
accident, was established.
(Br. App. 12). A review of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ)
interim order and relevant case law clearly demonstrate that such
contention is without merit.
In Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Whether the claimant had a preexisting
condition is relevant to the issue of
causation, but is not determinative of
whether the injury occurred "by accident.*
The key question here is whether the
occurrence was the unexpected cause or the
injury or the unexpected result of an
exertion. The evidence in this case reveals
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the claimant unexpectedly and without
any forewarning or anticipation injured his
back while putting on his coveralls. None of
the evidence indicated that the claimant had
experienced repeated pain or injury as with
an occupational disease or other foreseeable
injury. Under these circumstances, the
injury in the case at bar was Mby accident."
(emphasis added).
In American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 752 P.2d
912, 914 (Utah App. 1988), this Court heard the argument that
because the applicant had experienced bolts of pain his lower back
and legs since a 1983 accident, a subsequent 1985 injury occurring
when the applicant lifted a bucket of debris was not unexpected
and therefore not "by accident".

This Court held that such an

injury was not expected or intended, and therefore a finding of
"by accident" was not arbitrary and capricious but supported by
the evidence.

Icl. at 915.

And in Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237 (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of an ALJ that
a heart attack was not "by accident" where the claimant had
experienced similar pains four days earlier.
f
1

The court stated,

there is nothing in the claimant's job duties
to suggest that he would suffer a heart
attack. There is overwhelming evidence that
the claimant did not intend to have a heart
attack, nor did he anticipate one. These
factors • /. . require the conclusion that the
heart attack was by accident.

Id. at 239.
In the present case the ALJ took note of the definition
of accident provided in Allen specifically citing it in his
interim order, and then stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Applying this standard to the case at bar,
the Administrative Law Judge finds no
difficulty in determining that the low back
injury sustained by Youngfield occurred by
accident. Certainly, Mr. Youngfield did not
intend that he should develop low back
problems in the course of performing his
regular job duties, which included stocking
and lifting boxes of shotgun shells. Under
the standard of Allen, his injuries were the
unexpected result of exertions which occurred
at work and in the course of employment.
(R. 133-134).
This approach is in perfect harmony with the standard
set forth in Allen and elaborated on in Hone, American Roofing Co.
and Lancaster.

Clearly, the ALJ's finding the injury in the

present case was "by accident" is supported by the record and is
not arbitrary and capricious.
Moreover, the ALJ, demonstrated proper understanding
and application of the Allen test when he stated,

V

?

This conclusion [injury "by accident"],
however, does not completely answer the
question of whether Mr. Youngfield is
entitled to benefits under Section 35-1-45.
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Allen,
the second element of a compensable accident
requires proof of a causal connection between
the injury and the worker's employment
duties. . . . The majority then defines the
term "arising out of or in the course of
employment" to impose legal and medical
causation requirements.

(R. 134).
Defendants' contention that the ALJ confused the two
prerequisites of the Allen test and did not make a proper finding
that Mr. Youngfield's injury occurred "by accident" is wholly
without merit.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND A
LEGAL CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN MR.
YOUNGFIELD'S INJURY AND HIS EMPLOYMENT.
The second element of a compensable accident requires

proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker's
employment duties.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 22 (citation omitted).

In

order to establish the causal connection, the court adopted a twoprong test which dictates that both legal and medical causation be
established.

]ji. at 25.

To establish legal causation the court adopted the
approach advanced by Professor Larson in Workmen's Compensation
(1986).
To meet the legal causation requirement, a
claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his
condition.
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.

Larson describes the application of the

rule as follows:
If there is some personal causal contribution
in the form of a [preexisting condition], the
employment contribution must take the form of
an exertion greater than that of
nonemployment life. . . .
t

If there is no personal causal contribution,
that is, if there is no prior weakness or
disease, any exertion connected with the
employment and causally connected with the
[injury] as matter of medical fact is
adequate to satisfy the legal test of
causation.
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26.
In the present case, because Mr. Youngfield suffered
from preexisting conditions, the proper focus rests on whether the
Digitized by theto
Howard
W. Hunter
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lbs, is greater than that of nonemployment life.

In making such a

determination the court emphasized that an objective standard must
be utilized.

Id.

In evaluating typical nonemployment activity,
the focus is on what typical nonemployment
activities are generally expected of people
in today's society, not what this particular
claimant is accustomed to doing. Typical
activities and exertions expected of men and
women in the latter part of the 20th century,
for example include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage
for travel, changing a flat tire on an
automobile, lifting a small child to chest
height and climbing the stairs in buildings.
By using an objective standard, the case law
will eventually define a standard for typical
"nonemployment activity" in much the way case
law has developed the standard of care for
the reasonable man in tort law.
Id. at 26-27.
In the case at hand the ALJ took judicial notice that
lifting objects weighing 20 lbs. or less would not satisfy the
unusual exertion test for a person with a preexisting condition
mandated by Allen (R. 135, See, Allen, 729 P.2d at 26 footnote 8).
The ALJ also took judicial notice that lifting objects weighing 80
lbs. or more would satisfy an "unusual or extraordinary exertion"
for a Twentieth Century person in non-employment life (R. 135).
The issue of legal causation ultimately turned on the A U ' s
resolution of whether 47*5 lbs., an intermediate weight, satisfied
the threshold for legal causation.
The record indicates that the ALJ applied the proper
standard of preponderance of the evidence in making his
determination (R. 135, Allen, 729 P.2d at 23). The record is also
clear that the ALJ applied an objective standard in trying to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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determine what qualifies as an "unusual exertion" for the typical
Twentieth Century individual and never attempted to determine to
what Mr. Youngfield was personally accustomed (R. 135-136).

The

question proved difficult because the objective standard for
nonemployment activity dictated by Allen remains relatively new
and case law has not elaborated on the standard beyond the minimal
guidelines suggested by Allen, i.e. taking full garbage cans to
the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height
and climbing the stairs in buildings.

See, Allen, 729 P.2d at 26.

The court in Allen noted, "There is no fixed formula by
which the causation issue may be resolved, and the issue must be
determined on the facts of each case."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.

Defendants, in order to upset the finding that legal causation
existed in the present case, are required to demonstrate that the
decision of the ALJ was arbitrary and capricious.

American

Roofing Co., 752 P.2d at 915; See, Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736
237 at 241 (Utah 1987).

Defendants' assertions that the record

contains no evidence to support the ALJ's finding of legal
causation or that the ALJ failed to apply an objective standard
are not supported by a proper reading of the record.

On the

contrary, the record confirms that the ALJ followed the proper
steps for determining whether legal causation exits.
The question of whether the employment
activities of a given employee are sufficient
to satisfy the legal standard of unusual or
extraordinary effort involves two steps.
First, the agency must determine as a matter
of fact exactly what were the employmentrelated activities of the injured employee.
Second,
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activities amounted to unusual or
extraordinary exertion.
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1082
(Utah 1986).

The ALJ determined as a matter of fact that Mr.

Youngfield's employment related duties included lifting boxes of
shot gun shells (R. 134), and that the exertion required to
perform that activity was unusual and extraordinary (R. 137).
Accordingly, the ALJ's finding that legal causation existed could
not conceivably be held to be arbitrary and capricious and should,
therefore, be affirmed.
III. REFERRING THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION TO A
MEDICAL PANEL CANNOT REPRESENT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHERE THE ALJ FOLLOWED THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULES AND
REGULATIONS.
The second prong of the casual connection places the
burden of showing medical causation on the claimant.

However,

proof of medical causation is not restricted to any one method and
an applicant is given broad discretion in the type of evidence
which may be proffered.
V
i
•f

Under the medical cause test, the claimant
must show by evidence, opinion or otherwise
that the stress, strain, or exertion required
by his or her occupation led to the resulting
injury or disability.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 27 (emphasis added).
In Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986),
the claimant argued the ALJ erred in not referring his case to a
medical panel.

The court noted the reference to a medical panel

is controlled by statute.
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A. 1953,
S 35-1-77 and changed the requirement of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mandatory referral to the medical panel to a
permissive referral. Under the statute as
now written, "the commission may refer the
medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the commission."
Id. at 1012 (Emphasis added).
Utah Admin. Code R490-2-18 provides as follows:

1
?

Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the
Commission adopts the following guidelines in
determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A.
A panel will be utilized where:
1. One or more significant medical issues
are involved. Generally a significant
medical issue must be shown by conflicting
medical reports. Significant medical issues
are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of
permanent physical impairment which vary more
than 5% of the whole person; or
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more
than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy
amounting to more than $ 2,000.
2. In the opinion of the Commission, the
medical issues are so intertwined with the
events that determination of whether an
accident has occurred cannot be made without
first resolving the medical considerations.
3. Where, in the opinion of the
Commission, the evidence is insufficient for
the Commission to make a final determination,
the Commission may require an independent
medical evaluation, costs to be assessed
against the employer and/or Second Injury
Fund.
4. A hearing on objections to the panel
report may be scheduled if there is a proffer
of conflicting medical testimony or evidence
showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report.
5. The Commission may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician
for the purpose of obtaining a further
medical examination or evaluation pertaining
to the medical issues involved, and to obtain
a report addressing these medical issues in
all cases where:
(a) byThe
treating
has
failed
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refused to given an impairment rating;
(b) The employer or doctor considers the
claim to be non-industrial;
(c) A substantial injustice may occur
without such further evaluation.
In the present case none of the above conditions
existed which necessitated the need to refer the case to a medical
panel.

In fact, not only was there a lack of significant medical

issues, a conflict in medical opinions or reports or disputed
expenses, defendants never challenged the issue of medical
causation at the evidentiary hearing or in their request for
review before the entire Industrial Commission.

Instead,

defendants have, until the present appeal, focused all of their
arguments exclusively on the issue of legal causation.
Under the circumstances, where the issue of medical
causation was never challenged and the ALJ properly followed the
guidelines set forth by the Utah Administrative Rules governing
referral of a case to a medical panel, the ALJ could not have
abused his discretion by not referring the case to a medical
panel.
Defendants' reliance on Champion Home Builders v.
Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985), for the
proposition that referral to a medical panel is necessary in order
to determine medical causation is unfounded.

In the present case,

evidence of the causal connection was not "uncertain or highly
technicalH as required by Champion Home Builders.

As previously

mentioned, during the evidentiary hearing Mr. Youngfield offered
the only testimony.

Defendants arguments at the hearing, when

supplementing the record, and on motion for review, focused
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exclusively on the issue of legal causation.

As a result there

was no "uncertain or highly technical" evidence respecting the
issue of medical causation.
IV.

EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION IS SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED AND UNREBUTTED IN THE RECORD.
A proper analysis of medical causation differs

significantly from legal causation.

In medical causation the

focus is whether "there was a physiological causal linkage between
the injury and the job activity."

Holloway v. Industrial Comm'n,

729 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 1986) (J. Zimmerman concurring).

Stated in

other words, the key question in medical causation is whether,
given the worker's body and worker's exertion, the exertion in
fact contributed to the injury.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 24. Legal

causation on the other hand, focuses solely on the issue of
whether the nature of the exertion is sufficient to hold the
employer legally liable for the resulting injury.

Ici. at 25.

Based on the evidence in the record, as Mr. Youngfield
lifted a box of shotgun shells, he turned to his left to put the
box on the pallet and felt a sharp pain shoot from the center of
his back down his right leg (R. 15). No attempt was ever made to
rebut this evidence.

Given this evidence, the only evidence, the

record establishes sufficient evidence to conclude that Mr.
Youngfield's exertion, lifting the box, contributed to his injury.
Upon review of cases in which the standards established
in Allen are applied without a previous finding respecting medical
causation, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded where appropriate
that medical causation has been established from the record.
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Utah

Transit Authority v. Booth, 728 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah 1986); Miera
v, Industrial Commyn, 728 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1986); and
Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson, 733 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1987).
In the present case, although the ALJ did not make a specific
finding of medical causation, it is amply established by the
evidence.
If however, this Court should require a specific
finding of medical causation before affirming the decision of the
Industrial Commission, this Court should consider remanding the
case back to Industrial Commission in order to afford it an
opportunity to enter its finding which would then become
reviewable.

If this Court does not conclude that medical

causation is established by the record, such a procedure would be
most appropriate since the issue of medical causation was never
contested during the hearing or on defendants' motion for review.
To allow defendants to overturn the order of Industrial Commission
on the basis of an argument never presented to the Commission
would not serve the purposes of appellate review in overseeing the
correctness of lower court decisions based on the evidence and
arguments presented to it.
?

$

CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing arguments, respondent
respectfully request this Court to affirm the order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah in awarding applicant, Douglas
Youngfield workers' compensation benefits, or in the alternative
to remand the case back to the Industrial Commission allowing it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an opportunity to enter findings relevant to medical causation,
which would then make the case ripe for appellate review.
Dated this /IJA

day of August, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKENSON
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
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Injury arising out of or in court* of employment
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded
in Subdivision (5) of this section. State Rd.
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Utah 252,
190 P. 544 (1920).
Where mine superintendent was killed by
holdup bandits as he entered 6tore to purchase
cigar for his own use, his death was not compensable as "accidental" injury within this section since in order to recover for accidental injury there must be some causal connection or
relation between act causing injury and employment or duties of injured employee.
Westerdahl v. State Ins Fund, 60 Utah 325,
208 P. 494 (1922).
Where state road employee while working on
road sought shelter from storm and was struck
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in
course of employment. State Rd. Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P. 544
(1920).
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot
be said he is in the course of his employment
where he steps aside to engage in an altercation with some third person concerning a personal grievance wholly unrelated to matters
connected with his employment. Wilkerson v.

35-1-45

Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270
(1928).
Wife of deceased drugstore employee waa not
entitled to compensation where she did not sustain burden of proving that typhoid fever was
result of injury received in course of his employment. Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 81
UUh 141, 17 P.2d 205 (1932).
Death of beer truck driver after being taken
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in
his chest after making his second morning delivery, did not result from an accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment,
where substance of opinions of medical panel
was that death from coronary thrombosis with
myocardial infarction was not caused from the
exertion of deceased's work on that morning.
Burton v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353,
374 P.2d 439 (1962).
Regular course of employment
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident
while returning home from work was not killed
in an accident arising out of or in the course of
employment despite fact that decedent'6 hourly
wage had been increased due to location of construction site; increased hourly wage did not
constitute pay for travel time. Barney v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271
(1973).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation \ 1.
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L R.3d
616.
Workmen's compensation: injury or death
due to storms, 42 A L.R 3d 385.
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained
while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566.

Master and servant: employer's liability for
injury caused by food or drink purchased by
employee in plant facilities, 50 A.L.R.3d 505.
Workers* compensation law as precluding
employee's suit against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49 A.L R.4th 926.
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as
compensable, 52 A.L.R 4th 731.
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
•» 47.

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each Buch employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the iryury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
Payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur^ce carrier and not on the employee.
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.

f !

11

(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56.
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may
determine to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(0 The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
240
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35-1-77

(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
History: L. 1951, ch. 62, I 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 42 1-71.10, L. 1955, ch. 67, ft 1; 1969,
ch. 86, ft 9; 1979, ch. 138, ft 6; 1982, ch. 41,
I 1; 1988, ch. 116, ft 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the
previously undesignated first sentence as Subsection (l)(a), the previously undesignated second sentence as Subsections (2Ua) and (2Kb),
the previously undesignated third and fourth
sentences and the beginning of the previously
undesignated fifth sentence as Subsection
(2Mc), the end of the previously undesignated
fifth sentence as Subsection (2)(d), the previously undesignated sixth and seventh sentences as Subsection (2)(e), the previously undesignated eighth sentence as Subsection (2)(f)
and the previously undesignated ninth sentence as Subsection (2)(g). The amendment
also, in Subsection (1), added Paragraph (b)
and, in Paragraph (a), divided the formerly undivided language into two sentences and made
a series of minor stylistic changes; in Subsection (2)(a), inserted "medical director, or medical consultanta", substituted "to be necessary
or desirable** for "and thereafter" and made a

series of minor stylistic changes; added T h e
medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultants shall" at the beginning of Subsection (2Kb); in Subsection (2Kc), deleted "of the
panel" following "report" in the first sentence,
inserted "written" in the last two sentences
and made a series of minor stylistic changes
throughout the subsection; in Subsection (2>(d),
inserted "medical director, or medical consultants", deleted "by the commission" at the end
and made a series of minor stylistic changes; in
Subsection (2)(e), divided the former first sentence into the present first two sentences, inserted "the medical director, or the medical
consultants" in the second sentence and "or the
medical director or medical consultants" in the
third sentence and made a series of minor stylistic changes throughout the subsection; in
Subsection (2)(f) inserted "medical director, or
medical consultants" and "at the hearing" and
made a series of minor stylistic changes; and
rewrote Subsection (2)(g), which read "The expenses of such study and report by the medical
panel and of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the fund provided
by ft 35-1-68.*

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Duty of commission on remand of case.
Effect of 1982 amendment
Function of medical panel.
Mandatory referral to panel.
Objections to reportPanel report as evidence.
Qualifications of panel members.
Referral to panel.
—Discretion.
Report, statements and admission*.
Supplemental award.
Cited.
Duty of commission on remand of case.
Where an order of the commission was vacated and the cause remanded because of a deficiency in the evidence to support the report of
s medical panel appointed by the commission,
the commission was not required to make an
award based solely on the plaintifTs evidence;
but it was the responsibility of the commission
to make some disposition of plaintifTs application for an award and it was the prerogative of
the commission to make a determination upon

the evidence in the light of the decision of the
Supreme Court or to order and hold a supplemental hearing to allow the parties to present
additional evidence. Hackford v. Industrial
Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 1091
(1961).
Effect of 1982 amendment
The 1982 amendment of this section, making
the granting of a hearing discretionary, does
not enlarge or destroy vested or contractual
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

R490-M1. Hospital Tees Separate
Fees covering hospital care shall be separate from
those for professional services and shall not extend
beyond the actual necessary hospital care. When it
becomes evident that the patient needs DO further
hospital treatment, he must be discharged. All billIn** must be properly itemized and coded. . .
R490-2-12. Caartes for Special Drags, «*Charges for reasonably prescribed and administered supplies shall be paid upon receipt of an itemized, coded billing.
•••• .• -

a. The employee travels to a community other
than his/her own place of residence and the distance from said community and the employee's
home prohibits return by 10:00 p.m. and
b. The absence from home is necessary at the
normal hour for the meal billed; and
(2) Reasonable travel expenses, regardless of distance, amounting to the lesser of;
a. Taxi fare,
b. Bus fart,
• » r » . »i , . - . . V . - , \ J .
v.
c. Train fare, or
d. $.20 per mile for private conveyance.'
It490-2-13. Caarfes for Ordinary Dregs, fit.
B. This rule applies to all travel to and from
Fees covering ordinary dressing materials or drugs medical care with the following restrictions:
used in treatment shall not be charged separately but
(1) The carrier is not required to reimburse the
shall be included in the amount allowed for office injured employee more often than every three
dressings or treatment. If the record of the case months,unless
. -. ". ...;'
shows that it was necessary to use an extraordinary
a.
More
than
SI00
is
involved
or
amount of dressing materia) or drugs, as in treating
b. The case is about to be closed, and
large infected wounds or bums, these extra dressing
(2) All travel must be by the most direct route and
materials or drugs will be paid for at coat.
to the nearest location where adequate treatment is
R490-2-14. Fees for UascbeduWd Procedam
reasonably available.
Fees for medical or surgical procedures not app(3) Travel may not be required between the hours
earing in the Commission's current fee schedule of 10:00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m., unless approved by the
publication are subject to the Commission's appr- Commission.
oval and should be submitted to the Commission
(4) The Industrial Commission shall have jurisdiwhen the physician and employer or Insurance ction to resolve all disputes.
carrier do not agree on the value of the service. R490-2-1S. GaldeUnes for Utilization of Medical
Such fees shall be in proportion as nearly as practPaad
icable to fees for similar services appearing in this
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the
Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to s
R490-M5. Deatal lajarlca '
-!•«.•/••
:*,.>.
Where a worker sustains an accident in the course medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized where:
of his employment resulting in the loss of or injury
1. One or more significant medical issues are
to teeth, making dental work necessary, the injured
worker shall consult a dental surgeon and receive involved. Generally a significant medical issue must
such first aid as may be necessary to preserve, if be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
possible, the normal function of the injured teeth. medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of rxnnanent
The dental surgeon shall then file with the insurance
earner a report setting forth the nature of the injury physical impairment which vary more than 5% of
together with an estimate of the cost of restoration. the whole person; or
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the tempThe dental surgeon shall not proceed with the restoration until authority has been granted by the ins- orary total cutoff date which vary more than ninety
urance carrier, provided, however, that if an empl- (90) days; or
(c) Medical expenses In controversy amounting to
oyer maintains a medical staff or designates a
company doctor, the employee shall first report to more than $2,000.
2. In the opinion of the Commission, the medical
that medical staff or medical officer and be guided
by directions then given. If the carrier refuses issues are so intertwined with the events that s detpayment at the level estimated by the dental ermination of whether an accident has occurrtd
surgeon, the employee may choose to pay the diff- cannot be made without fix\\ resolving the medical
'
erence jand seek adjudication by Application for considerations.
J. Where, in the opinion of the Commission, the
Hearing. A dental surgeon may choose to settle for
the payment allowed, or the carrier shall direct the evidence is insufficient for the Commission to mak'
employee to a dental surgeon who will provide bis a final determination, the Commission may require
services at the payment level specified by the carrier. an independent medical evaluation, cost $ "jjjj
assessed against the employer and/or Second
R m - M 4 . Amtmlaact Charges
Injury Fund.
.
Ambulance charges must not eicecd the rates
4. A hearing on objections to the panel repon
adopted by the State Emergency Medical Service
may be scheduled if there is a proffer of ™»xM
Com mission for similar services.
•,'"*•
medical testimony or evidence showing • oeea »
R490-M7. Travel ABowaace/Ter Dsttt
^
clarify the medical panel report.
. ^
A. An employee who, based upon his/her phy3. The Commission may authorize an tnjw*
sician's advice, requires hospital, medical, surgical, worker to be examined by another physician for mc
or consultant services for injuries arising out of or purpose of obtaining a further medical w*^"?™*
In the course of employment and who is authorized or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues tf^
by the self-Insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial Ived. and to obtain a report addressing u ~
Commission of Utah to obtain such services from a medical issues in all cases where: J
tnedw
physician and/or hospital shall be entitled to:
(a) The treating physician has failed or reiusco
(1) Actual and reasonable subsistence expenses not
. .^ „
to exceed S15 per day for meals and not to exceed give an impairment rating; .
(b)Law
TheLibrary,
employer
or doctor
we **»*
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(c) A substantial injustice tnay^cll
further evaluation.
R490-M9. Notice to Health Cart P r o
Any not.ee from a carrier denyint 1
must be mailed to the Commissi
provider. Where it car, be shown,
medical care provider and the injured
received a denial of further care by
earner or self-insured employer, fur
may be performed at the expense of
Any future ratification of the denial
usion will not be considered a retro*
will serve to uphold the force and
previous denial notice.
E490-2-20. Medical Records '
Medical practitioners shall provi
medical reeords to the partJes to an
for the following rates:
A. Thtfirst20 copies at $.$0 each an.
B. the remainder at $.35 each fo
irom microfilmed records, and
C. $^25 each for copies, made from or
D. These charges are designed to <
»sts of copying and the wages of i
JL7*?* ** r$ons ^ wuitites ernitk
mcedical records involving an industrial
U) The injured employee,
(2) The employer of the ir!jured em pi,
(3) The employer's workers' comt
rtnee carrier.
*
ti 4 ) 7** Uninsured Employer* 1
Indemnity Fund prior to July 1,1986)
)2 Jhe Second Injury Fund
™ * , n d u s t r i a l Commission, and
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Workers Compensation

R490-3-3

(c) A substantial injustice may occur without such employer retaining an obligation for a designated
amount as a deductible and the insurance company
further evaluation
paying all amounts due thereafter up to a maximum
said
immunity
n
d
the
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APPENDIX 1:
INTERIM FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
%%

CASE No. 87000510
*

DOUGLAS YOUNCFIELD,

Applicant,

*
*
*

INTERIM
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
SMITH & EDWARDS COMPANY and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH and
SECOND INJURY FUNDf

*

AND ORDER

*
*

Defendants*
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 21,
1987, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Gilbert A- Martinez, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Joseph
C. Foley, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd,
Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was not present at the hearing.

i

i
At the commencement of the hearing, the parties set forth the issues
to be resolved by the Administrative Law Judge, which include the following:
1.

Whether the industrial incident of February 5, 1987,
constitutes a compensable industrial accident under
the Utah Workers* Compensation Act?

2.

Whether or not the applicant is entitled to temporary
total disability as a direct result of the industrial
accident of February 5, 1987?
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3.

Whether liability should be apportioned between the
defendant employer and the defendant Second Injury
Fund?

4.

Attorney's fees and interest, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and 35-1-87.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the factual and medical issues were
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. This case was diaried
for thirty (30) days in order to allow the defendant employer and its insurer
an opportunity to investigate the validity of the applicant's claim, regarding
the actual weight of the object the applicant lifted at the time of his injury.
Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing,
including the investigative report of the defendants dated August 5, 1987, and
good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law Judge finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The Administrative Law Judge hereby finds that the applicant in this
matter, Douglas Youngfield, sustained an injury by accident on February 5,
1987, during the course of employment with the defendant employer, Smith &
Edwards Company. On the date of the industrial accident, the applicant was
performing his regular job duties as a stock clerk. At that time, the applicant was lifting a box of shotgun shells containing 25 small boxes of shells.
The applicant testified that he lifted the box of shotgun shells from a cart
to place the box onto a pallet. As the applicant lifted the box of shotgun
shells and turned to the left to set the box onto a pallet, he felt a sharp
pain into his low back, with pain radiating down into his right leg. The
applicant was standing erect at the time of the injury, holding the box, and
he felt the pain as he started to bend over to place the box of shotgun shells
onto the pallet. The applicant testified that he did not know the exact
weight of the box of shotgun shells, but estimated the weight to be approximately 75 pounds. He estimated the range of the weight of the box of shotgun
shells to be between 75 to 100 pounds. After the hearing, the defendants were
allowed an opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the exact weight
of the box of shotgun shells. In an Affidavit dated August 10, 1987, Gary
Uttf investigator for the defendant insurer, stated that Mike Casey, an
employee of Smith & Edwards, and himself weighed the case of shotgun shells by
using a scale maintained at the employer's premises. According to the Affidavit, the weight of the case of shotgun shells was 47-1/2 pounds, not the 75
pounds as estimated by the claimant in this matter.
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Following this alleged industrial accident, the applicant sought chiropractic care from Richard Barton. The applicant received fifteen chiropractic treatments for his low back problems from Dr. Barton between February 7,
1987f to May of 1987. See Exhibit "A-2".
On February 16, 1987, the applicant visited Craig K. Julien, M.D..
See Exhibit M A-4".
On February 26, 1987, the applicant underwent a magnetic
resonance imaging test of his lumbar spine at the St. Benedict's Hospital.
The MRI test of the lumbar spine showed the following impression:
"Small focal herniation, L5-S1 rightward."
See Exhibit •tA-5M.
By way of history, the applicant testified he had prior low back
problems before this industrial accident. In November of 1983, he visited a
chiropractor in the State of Colorado for low back problems. The applicant
received chiropractic care from Rick D. Weum, D.C., at the Colorado Springs
Chiropractic Center.
The applicant received twelve treatments for low back
pain and shoulder probl ems from November 17, 1983, to May of 1984. On crossexamination, it was brought out that the applicant had low back problems
dating back to 1977, when he was treated at the St. Benedict's Hospital for
low back problems.
In 1977, the applicant underwent x-rays of the lumbar
spine regarding his low back problems.
In regard to non-related health problems, the applicant testified
that he has a special skin disease entitled •'Scleroderma Morphea." This skin
disease was diagnosed in April of 1983, when the applicant was serving in the
military at Fort Carson. The applicant testified that the Veteran's Administration has awarded him a 10% disability award for the skin disease, which has
the potential of being terminal. The applicant receives approximately $69.00
per month from the Veteran's Administration for this skin disease.
>

j
In July of 1985, the applicant sustained injuries to his neck and
mid-back as a result of an automobile accident when he was rear ended. The
applicant testified that he received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Margolies
from July of 1985, to' October of 1985. The applicant testified that a personal injury claim has been filed and is still pending.
Following the current industrial accident of February 5, 1987, it
appears from the medical records that the applicant has received basically
chiropractic treatment.
In addition, the applicant underwent the magnetic
resonance imaging test at the St. Benedict's Hospital. Furthermore, on March
10, 1987, the applicant had a one time evaluation from Dr. B. E. Allison,
orthopedic surgeon.
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At the time of the industrial incident of February 5, 1987, the applicant, who is a 32-year-old male, was earning a weekly wage of $219.48 per
week. The applicant was not married, however, he had one dependent child
under the age of eighteen. Based upon this weekly wage and one dependent, the
applicant qualifies for a compensation rate at $151.00 per week. The applicant was born on December 17, 1954, and his Social Security Number is
528-92-1497.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The key issue in this case is whether or not the applicant sustained
a compensable industrial accident on February 5, 1987, during the course of
employment with the defendant employer. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45,
provides in pertinent part the following:
••Every employee. . . who is injured. . . by accident
arising out of or in the course of employment. . . shall be
entitled to receive and shall be paid (compensation). . . "
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act fails to define what constitutes
an injury "by accident". Since 1917, the Utah Supreme Court has attempted to
provide guidelines regarding the definition of an accident. In the recent
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 46 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court defined an accident as follows:
•••""••. . . A n accident is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of
the injury.M
In other words, an accident Is an "unexpected resulf, regardless of
whether it is produced by a usual or an unusual event. This follows the definition of accident which was articulated in Carlins v. Industrial Commission.
399 P.2d 202 (Utah 1965), where the Utah Supreme Court held that a compensable
accident includes "the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other
repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such a manner as to properly
fall" within the coverage of Section 35-1-45.
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the Administrative Law
Judge finds no difficulty in determining that the low back injury sustained by
Youngfield occurred by accident. Certainly, Mr. Youngfield did not intend
that he should develop low back problems in the course of performing his
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regular job duties, which included stocking and lifting boxes of shotgun
shells. Under the standard of Allent his injuries were the unexpected result
of exertions which occurred at work and in the course of employment.
This conclusion, however, does not completely answer the question of
whether Mr. Youngfield is entitled to benefits under Section 35-1-45. As the
Utah Supreme Court explained in Allen, the second element of a compensable
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the
worker's employment duties. The majority opinion in Allen defines the term
••accident" to mean "unexpected result." The majority then defines the term
"arising out of or in the course of employment" to impose legal and medical
causation requirements.
See U.C.A., Section 35-1-45.
Unfortunately, the
requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon
the physical condition of the employee at the time that he was employed by the
employer. A worker having no pre-existing incapacities need only prove that
the accident was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." However, in cases
where the injured employee was suffering from pre-existing conditions, legal
causation has a different meaning.
Such a worker may receive compensation
only if the employment contribution to the internal low back breakdown is
"greater than that of non-employment life." Very simply, the Utah Supreme
Court concluded in Allen that where the claimant suffers from a pre-existing
condition, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal
causation.
Where there is no pre-existing condition, a usual or ordinary
exertion is sufficient.
In the case at bar, the medical records contained in Exhibit "A-3",
and "D-l" show that the applicant was suffering from pre-existing conditions
into his low back. Even the applicant testified on the record that he had
chiropractic care for low back problems from November of 1983, to May of 1984,
at the Colorado Springs Chiropractic Center. On cross-examination, it was
brought out that the applicant had low back problems dating back to 1977, when
he was treated at the St. Benedict's Hospital for low back pain. Furthermore,
in July of 1985, the applicant sustained injuries to his back as the result of
an automobile accident when he was rear-ended. This evidence clearly establishes that the applicant had a pre-existing condition in his low back, and
therefore the Administrative Law Judge is required to apply the higher
standard of legal causation as set forth in the Allen case.
The key issue in this case now turns to the question of whether or
not the lifting of an object weighing 4 7-1/2 pounds satisfies the higher legal
standard for establishing legal causation. To meet the legal causation requirement involving a case with pre-existing conditions, the injured employee
must establish that the employment contributed something substantial to
increase the risk he already faced in everyday life. Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 46 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1986) affirmed in Specialty Cabinet
Company v. Montoya. 47 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1986).
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In cases involving internal injuries such as low back problems, the
issue is proof of a causal connection between the injury and the industrial
event.
Compensable injuries can be identified by first considering legal
cause and then its medical cause. The standard of proof of a causal
connection between the industrial incident and the complaints of pain is the
preponderance of the evidence. Where the injured employee suffers from a preexisting condition, such as the case at bar, an "unusual or extraordinary
exertion" is required to prove legal causation. Unusual or extraordinary
exertion must be defined objectively. The unusual exertion must be compared
with non-employment life, instead of comparing it with employment activities
that this or any other employee would have been engaged in. The unusual
exertion must involve an exertion greater than that normally performed during
non-employment life by a Twentieth Century person.
Whether lifting an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds constitutes "unusual
exertion" for a Twentieth Century person in non-employment life is difficult
to answer. The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice that lifting
objects weighing 10, IS and 20 pounds would not satisfy the unusual exertion
test. There is a presumption that the Twentieth Century person performs nonemployment lifting activities using weights in the amount of 10, IS or 20
pounds. As the court pointed out in Allen, typical activities and exertions
expected of men and women in the Twentieth Century include taking full garbage
cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat
tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the
stairs in buildings. In a footnote, the court points out that lifting a 20
pound object does not satisfy legal causation in those cases where the employee had a pre-existing condition. See Footnote No. 8, Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 46 Utah Adv. Rep. 12. The Administrative Law Judge also takes
judicial notice that lifting objects weighing 80, 90, or 100 pounds constitutes an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" for a Twentieth Century person in
non-employment life. The difficult question is whether lifting an object
weighing 4 7-1/2 pounds constitutes unusual exertion to meet the higher
standard of legal causation. Obviously, 47-1/2 pounds falls somewhere between
the 20 pounds which would not be compensable and the 80 pounds which would be
compensable.
• /

In analyzing whether an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds constitutes
••unusual exertion" requires a determination of which classification of
Twentieth Century individuals we are addressing. As a former Marine in the
United States Marine Corp, it is obvious that U. S. Marines as a
classification of individuals would consider lifting a 47-1/2 pound object as
being certainly a minor exertion for a puny weakling or a non-macho type.
This, of course, does not apply to all groups. During the past 1-1/2 years,
this Administrative Law Judge has had the opportunity of visiting a nursing
facility on a weekly basis. Using the patients at the nursing facility as
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another classification group, it certainly would be impossible for them to
lift an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds. In many cases, these individuals find
it difficult to lift a glass of water.
This certainly does not suggest that
nursing home patients are inferior citizens; they simply cannot exert physical
strength like other groups of individuals.
What about classifications based upon age and gender. Obviously, a
25 to 35-year-old individual would have much less difficulty in lifting a
47-1/2 pound object than would an individual between the ages of 65 and 75.
Although sex has never been a consideration in determining the compensability
of workers* compensation claims, many could effectively argue that a male
would have less exertion in lifting a 47-1/2 pound object than would a
female.
Very simply, who is this Twentieth Century individual, and what are
the typical activities expected of him or her during non-employment life?
Perhaps, too much emphasis is given to the exact weight of the object being
lifted. As stated above, a 20 pound object is considered easy to lift and an
80 pound object must be considered as extraordinary exertion. But, this may
not be entirely an accurate reflection of how an injury may occur. The weight
of the object is solely one factor. Let us not forget that there are four
factors:
(1) Weight of the object being moved;
(2) The motion being performed (proper or improper ways of
lifting);;
(3) The duration of the motion; and
(4) Position of the person performing the exertion.

By utilizing these four factors, an illustration perhaps can assist
us in determining what constitutes an unusual or extraordinary exertion.
Professional body builders and weight lifters teach you that the amount of
weight to be lifted during an exercise is proportionately determined by the
motion to be performed and the amount of repetitions in the exercise.
Obviously, a weight lifter can use greater weight when performing squats and
dead lifts, than can be lifted when performing french curls or lateral
raises. An experienced body builder may use 400 pounds in squatting, but only
use 50 pounds in performing lateral raises. In addition, the duration or
numbers of repetition that the individual will be lifting the object has to be
considered. A body builder performing one-arm dumbbells with the weight of
47-1/2 pounds may find the first five to ten repetitions to be fairly easy,
however, after he has reached the 25th or 30th motion, his muscle becomes weak
and the dumbbell weighing 4 7-1/2 pounds takes on the appearance that it weighs
close to 100 pounds. This is when an individual is susceptible to injury. At
a time when the muscle can no longer control the weight due to fatigue, and
the weight of the object places complete stress upon the tendons, elbow and
nerves.
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In the case at bar, the evidence clearly establishes that the
specific weight of the object (a box of shotgun shells) lifted by the
applicant at the time of the allged industrial injury was 47-1/2 pounds.
There was no evidence presented at the time of the hearing to establish that
the applicant was utilizing improper motion in lifting this weight.
Obviously, the proper means of lifting an object from the floor is to bend
your knees, rather than bend at the waist and place the full stress on your
lower back. In addition, there was no evidence to establish that the duration
of the lifting motion was substantial or significant. The applicant lifted
the 47-1/2 pound object once, not several times, and did not carry the box of
shotfun shells any distance. The applicant solely lifted a box of shotgun
shells from a cart to a pallet, and as he turned to set the box on the pallet,
he felt a sharp pain in his low back. Furthermore, there was not evidence
elicited to establish that the applicant was in an unusual position at the
time that he was performing this lifting activity. In the case at bar, the
applicant argues from the record that lifting an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds
is certainly an unusual or extraordinary exertion without other factors.
The Administrative Law Judge hereby rules that the applicant, who is
a 32-year old male, is entitled to Utah workers* compensation benefits as a
direct result of his industrial accident of February 5, 1987, on the basis
that lifting an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds represents an "unusual and
extraordinary exertion" to establish proof of legal causation. Very simply,
the Administrative Law Judge finds that a Twentieth Century person performing
non-employment life activities would not be generally expected to lift an
object of 47-1/2 pounds during a normal day away from work.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Smith & Edwards Company
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay the applicant, Douglas
Youngfield, temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $151.00 per
week for 12.286 weeks, or a total of $1,855.19, as temporary total disability
for a period from February 8, 1987, to May 4, 1987, (the date the applicant
returned to work), pursuant to Section 35-1-65, U.C.A.; said amount to be paid
in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Smith & Edwards Company
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay interest on the amounts
awarded under this Order at the rate of 87. per annum from the date when each
benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable, pursuant to
Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any claims for a potential permanent
partial disability, under Section 35-1-66, U.C.A., shall be reserved until the
applicant has been rated by a qualified physician or orthopedic surgeon.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants. Smith & Edwards Company
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay all of the reasonable
medical expenses incurred as a direct result of the industrial accident of May
5, 1987; said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical
Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Smith & Edwards Company
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay Joseph C. Foley, attorney
for the applicant, the sum of $371.04, as attorney fees in this case under
Section 35-1-87, U.C.A.; said amount to be deducted from the aforesaid award
of the applicant and to be paid in a lump sum directly to the attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

^Ma

Gilbert A. Martinez
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
< ^ ^ day of October, 1987.
ATTEST;
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Rodney C Smith Assistant Director
560 So-tn 300 East

Workers
Compensation
Fundi*

Post O'.'.iCy. Box 45420
So/. Lakj Ztty. Uta, 184,45-0420

November 12, 198/

Gilbert A. Martinez
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Re:

Douglas Youngfleld
File No: 87-04673
Inj: 02-05-87
Empl: Smith & Edwards Co.

Dear Judge Martinez:
Please accept this letter as the Workers Compensation Fund's Motion For
Review of your Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered
on the above referenced matter on October 26, 1987. Specifically, the
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and Smith and Edwards Co. take exception to
your finding that the claimant herein was Involved 1n activities which
satisfied the higher legal causation standard of the Allen accident test.
In this case, you found that Mr. Youngfleld injured his back while
lifting a 47 1/2 lb. box of shotgun shells. You note that there was no
evidence of "Improper motion 1n lifting." Further, you state that there was
no evidence that repeated lifting was Involved.
Rather, Mr. Youngfield
lifted the box of shotgun shells once, not several times, and did not carry
the box any distance. Finally, you state that there was no evidence that
Mr. Youngfleld was In an unusual position at the time of his onset of back
pain. You conclude,
, "In the case at bar f the applicant argues from the record that lifting an
, object weighing 47 1/2 lbs. Is certainly an unusual or extraordinary
exertion without other factors."
The defendants argue that the activity described herein 1s identical to
the typical activities expected of men and women In the latter part of the
20th Century.
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined such activities to
include: taking full cans of garbage to the street, lifting and carrying
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the stairs In buildings. On their face,
these activities are as stressful as the one In which the claimant,
Mr. Youngfleld, was Involved.
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To substantiate our position, defendants proffer to the Industrial
Commission the testimony of Laurie Stewart, Director of the Cottonwood
Hospital Back Institute. Ms. Stewart holds an M.S. Degree \* Health S e r v e s
from the University of Utah along with two B.S. Degrees, one In Physical
Therapy from the University of Utah and one 1n Physical Education from
Brlgham Young University. Ms. Stewart, upon reviewing :he *acts of th'.s
"accident" as found by the Administrative Law Judge, beHovss, and would
testify, that the activity in which Mr. Youngfield was involved placed far
less stress on his back than such ordinary everyday living activities as
sneezing or coughing. In fact, there is no evidence of position or movement
tnat would suggest any magnification of the weight in Mr. Youngfield's arms
so as to transform his activities from those involving the usual wear and
tear of non-employment life exertions to ones involving unusual exertions.
Obviously, unusual exertion Is needed to meet the higher legal causation
standard in this matter.
The
Workers
Compensation
Fund
respectfully
requests
that the
Administrative Law Judge, or the entire Commission, reverse the finding of
compensability made on October 26, 1987. Simply stated, Mr. Youngfield did
not suffer a compensable industrial accident given his pre-existing condition
as he failed to show the requisite higher standard of legal causat'on.
Objectively, his activities were not unusual or extraordinary.
In the
alternative, the defendants move that this matter be re-opened and that an
additional hearing be set. At that hearing, the defendants would produce
Ms. Stewart for the purpose of taking her testimony and allowing
cross-examination relative to the mechanics of Mr. Youngfield's alleged
industrial accident. Also, If desired, the claimant could present any expert
testimony to substantiate his claim.
Yours truly,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

^koLut-aaJjJ-t
Dennis V.<5Tloyd
Attorney at Law

oyi/jf
»

cc:

Joseph C. Foley, Attorney at Law, 543 25th Street, Ogden, UT 84401
Erie V. Boorman, Adm. of Second Injury Fund
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
%

Case No:

DOUGLAS YOUNCFIELD,
Applicant,
vs.
SMITH & EDWARDS COMPANY and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On October 26, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
awarding
the
applicant
in
the
above-captioned
case
temporary
total
compensation and medical expenses (and reserving the issue of permanent
partial impairment benefits) related to a February 5, 1987 industrial injury.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's pre-existing low back
condition required that the Administrative Law Judge apply the more stringent
legal causation test as specified in Allen v the Industrial Commission. 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) in order to determine whether the applicant's injury
occurred M by accident" thus causing it to be compensable. That test requires
that the applicant be injured pursuant to exertion that is greater than what
is encountered by the average person in everyday non-employment life. After
thoroughly discussing and analyzing the mechanics of the injury and the legal
standard as set forth in the Allen case, the Administrative Law Judge
determined that the applicant's lifting of a 47-1/2 lb box of shotgun shells
was exertion sufficient to meet the Allen higher standard legal causation
test. As result, the Administrative Law Judge found the applicant's February
5, 1987 injury was compensable and the Administrative Law Judge awarded
benefits.
On November 12, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the
defendant/Workers Compensation Fund filed a Motion for Review. Counsel for
the Fund states that the applicant's lifting injury is no different than the
lifting activities listed in the Allen case as normal or usual exertions
encountered by twentieth century individuals in non-employment life. As no
unusual exertion is involved, counsel for the Workers Compensation Fund finds
the Administrative Law Judge should have found the legal causation test was
not met and should have denied all benefits as result.
The Commission finds that the only issue to be reviewed is the issue
regarding whether the mechanics of the applicant's injury shows sufficient
exertion to establish legal causation per the Allen compensability test. The
Commission adopts the Findings of Fact as stated by the Administrative Law
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DOUGLAS YOUNGFIELD
ORDER DENYING MOTION
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Judge in the October 26f 1987 Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order. In the Order, the Administrative Law Judge discusses the difficulty in
determining what normal non-employment exertion is for the average twentieth
century person. The variance between age and physical capacity that occurs
within the group of all twentieth century persons is well illustrated by the
Administrative Law Judge's discussion and the Commission agrees that what
typifies the average person is difficult to discern.
In addition, the
Commission has commented in recent Orders on review regarding the difficulty
of comparing the list of usual exertion activities from Allen with a
particular injury fact scenario to determine whether the injury fits within
the class of activities specified in Allen. Because the box lifted by the
applicant in this case is not clearly within the Larson weight parameters
quoted by the Supreme Court in Allen as being usual exertion, and keeping in
mind the beneficent purpose behind workers compensation, the Commission must
confirm the Administrative Law Judge's determination that the legal causation
test is met in this case.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's November 12, 1987 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's October 25, 1987 Order
is hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the Court of Appeals only
within the thirty (30) day time limit and as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83.

Lenice L. Nielsen
Commissioner

Q^V^

Johnyrlorez
Coramissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
3)UL
day of February, 1988.
ATTEST:

L. AJAA.lldL
-inda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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